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ABSTRACT
This research presents an example of transformative case law from the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and the Constitutional Court of Colombia. 
Due to the fact that these Courts had seriously contemplated the right to free, 
prior and informed consultation of indigenous peoples and afro-descendants, 
this study explains the standards and statistics produced for 25 years on the 
topic. It focuses on the principal outcomes of the interamerican case Sara-
maka v. Suriname (2007) and the Colombian Decision T-129 of 2011, which 
nowadays encompass the most plausible and balanced standard of protec-
tion on the matter. However, the progressive outcomes are at risk of being 
regressively changed. For that reason, this study analyses the relevance of 
“binding consent” as an alternative to the problematic category or wrongly 
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RESUMEN
En esta investigación se expone un ejemplo de diálogo judicial y transformador 
entre la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Corte Constitucio-
nal de Colombia. En la medida en que estos dos tribunales se han tomado 
en serio los derechos a la consulta previa, libre e informada de los pueblos 
indígenas y afrodescendientes, se presentan detalladas tablas con los casos 
y las estadísticas producidas durante 25 años sobre el tema. La investigación 
se centra en el histórico precedente de la Corte Interamericana Saramaka v. 
Suriname (2007) y la sentencia T-129 de 2011 de la Corte Constitucional de 
Colombia por medio de la cual se profundizó el diálogo judicial y de donde 
quizá ha surgido el estándar de protección más plausible y equilibrado en la 
materia, aunque en riesgo de ser modificado regresivamente. De ahí que se 
puntualice la relevancia del “consentimiento vinculante” como alternativa 
al mal denominado “poder de veto”. 
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INTRODUCTION
Free, prior and informed consent (fPiC) of indigenous peoples and afro-
descendants on matters that have the potential to affect their interests and 
territories has become one of the most powerful tools that positive and 
jurisprudential law has created in recent decades to protect the collective 
rights of these populations.1 In the construction of transformative constitu-
tionalism in the region;2 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
Constitutional Court of Colombia have become a kind of beacons irradiating 
principles and supranational values. In other words, these two courts have set 
up a supranational dialogue beyond hierarchical or vertical preconceptions. 
Regarding the indigenous question in the constitutional Latin American 
context, R. Gargarella asks: “how should we solve, then, the questions posed 
by the emerging tensions between the rights and interests of indigenous groups 
and rights and interest of the rest of the population?”.3
This study articulates an answer to that question contextualizing the is-
sue in the region (section 1) and presenting the most relevant and current 
standards of case law according to the mentioned Courts (sections 2 and 3). 
In general terms, this research complements and critically annotates the case 
law and legal grounds of the right to fPiC focusing on the issue of binding 
consent. For this reason, this article will not provide an empirical review of 
how the right to prior consultation itself is implemented. Further, it develops 
a series of arguments to highlight the main aspects of this exemplary judicial 
dialogue and the outcomes. 
For instance, it will explain why the precedents are transformative and 
why are the outcomes at risk. Furthermore, it will provide strong reasons to 
not understand prior consultation in terms of who vetoes who (section 4). 
In (section 5) the study explains the reasons to consider this case law as an 
emblematic example of dialogue and elucidates some problems that dialogue 
and the constitutionalization of international law in the region face, particu-
larly, under the framework of a broader ius commune. Finally, this analysis 
points to regional integration as a fundamental “piece” to articulate a long-
term dialogic, transformative and common constitutionalism for the region.
1  About the origin and meaning of the category “fPiC”, see hanna, P. and vanClay, f. 
Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples and the Concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. In 
Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal. Vol. 31, No. 2, 2013, 146-157.
2  See Bogdandy, a. V. et al. Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America: The 
Emergence of a New Ius Commune. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. About the origins, 
klare, l. Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism. In South African Journal of 
Human Rights. Vol. 14, No. 1, 146-188, 146. 
3  gargarella, r. Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Engine Room of 
the Constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 180-181. 
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1. WHY THE INDIGENOUS QUESTION MATTERS? 
Latin America, with more than 21 million square kilometres of surface area 
and approximately 600 million of supposedly non “well-ordered”4 inhabitants, 
has had the fortune of preserving massive amounts of natural resources which 
includes much more than forests, rivers and exotic animals. For centuries, 
many groups of indigenous and afro-descendants have made their livelihood 
and survived in a kind of balance or at least in a way that maintains a non-
self-destructive relationship with the environment or a way that is incongruent 
with the mainstream development model.
More than 400 years after the Valladolid Debate took place, in a kind of 
cyclical history this issue seems to remain a core part of the controversy with 
different characters.5 Yesterday, it was western European empires; today, it 
is the belated arrival of industrialization to the region and its forced immer-
sion into a globalized market economy with national and international actors 
who have pushed several areas and groups to reprise their historical roles of 
“backyard” with their human and natural resources.6 This is especially so for 
those communities who in most cases are surviving in desolate regions, or 
as so denominated by hegemonic powers: “developing countries,” i.e. Latin 
America, Africa and several parts of Asia, or to use an imperfect term, what 
has been called “global south”.7 This notwithstanding, there is a logical dif-
ficulty derived from that binary classification between global north and a 
global south. Located in the south, are Australia, New zealand or Singapore 
part of the global south? Located in the north, are Romania, Ukraine or 
Moldavia part of the global north? 
Due to this fact, more than the geographical location, the nuclear aspect 
links with the conception of developing. For instance, the World Bank changed 
its terminology in its 2016 edition of World Development Indicators (Wdi), 
no longer distinguishing between “developing” and “developed” countries. 
According to the organization, this terminology is becoming “less relevant,” 
and as of now it recommends using the term “developing world.” Nevertheless, 
4  raWls, J. The Law of Peoples. In Critical Inquiry. Vol. 20, No. 36, 1993, 44-45. 
5  The Valladolid debate (1550-1551) is considered the first western controversy about 
moral concerns regarding indigenous rights in the so called “new world”. See, fernández, f. 
La controversia entre Ginés de Sepúlveda y Bartolomé de las Casas. Una revisión. In Boletín 
Americanista. Vol. 42, No. 301, 1992. For an overview on the issue of indigenous rights until 
today, see duve, T. Indigenous Rights in Latin America: A Legal Historical Perspective. In Max 
Planck Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series. No. 2, 2017. 
6  Jones, M. America’s Backyard. In Diplomacy and Statecraft Journal. Vol. 11, No. 1, 
2000, 291-298, 291.
7  From a counter-hegemonic approach, “the words Global South and Global North [are 
offered] as less pejorative synonyms”. Bonilla, D. Constitutionalism of the Global South: The 
Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa, and Colombia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013, 4. 
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the word choice continues to be pejorative and problematic. Is “developing” 
the principal category to divide the world? 
In 1990, Joseph Nye, in a seminal article published in the journal Foreign 
Policy, pointed out that “multinational corporations are sometimes more 
relevant to achieving a country’s goals than are other states.”8 Twenty-six 
years later, the same publication signalled the rise of the titans, the so-called 
“metanationals,” and named the current top 25 companies that are more 
powerful than many countries. To cite some examples ExxonMobil “today 
boasts a 75,300-strong workforce that explores for oil and natural gas on six 
continents,” Glencore plc is “notorious for its business interests in Africa 
[and] has the power to make or break economies there or Nestlé, the “largest 
food maker, peddling products in 196 nations.”9
In Latin America, megaprojects (public and/or private) and (north-north/
north-south) associations, incomparable in scale with the ones experienced 
in the past, are forcing communities and the environment to undergo several 
challenges.10 Extractive industries and infrastructure interventions in their 
territories are some of the major dangers.11 To date, nearly all Latin American 
countries have ratified the ilo Convention 169/89 (Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples Convention) or its predecessor ilo Convention 107/57, with the latter 
is now interpreted by the ilo Supervisory bodies in line with ilo Convention 
169. Since the last decades, indigenous peoples are playing a relevant role in 
the international arena as “new citizens of the world” whit a clear leadership 
from Latin America.12 
For instance, as part of the “developing world” just have ratified the afore-
mentioned conventions: African Central Republic, Angola, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, 
Guinea–Bissau, India, Iraq, Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, Syria and Tunisia. Been 
worse in the “developed world,” with its history of exploitation of the global 
south, only: Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Portugal, Norway and Spain seem 
committed internationally to the Convention and have ratified it.13 
Seen Graph 1, should Latin American countries require ratification of 
ilo 169, environmental protocols or trade agreements to allow interventions 
8  nye, J. S., Jr. Soft Power. In Foreign Policy, No. 80, 1990, 153-171, 157. 
9  khanna, P. and franCis, D. Rise of the Titans. In Foreign Policy, No. 2017, 2016, 50.
10  kanosue, Y. When Land Is Taken Away: States Obligations under International Human 
Rights Law Concerning Large-scale Projects Impacting Local Communities. In Human Rights 
Law Review. Vol. 15, No. 4, 2015, 643-667, 643.
11  gonzález, D. Peasants’ Right to Land: Addressing the Existing Implementation and 
Normative Gaps in International Human Rights Law. In Human Rights Law Review. Vol. 14, 
No. 4, 2014, 589-609, 589.
12  See stavenhagen, R. Indigenous Peoples as New Citizens of the World. In Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean Ethnic Studies. Vol. 4, No. 1, 2009, 1-15.
13  For a decolonial approach of the indigenous question, see sierra-Camargo, J. The Im-
portance of Decolonizing International Human Rights Law: The Prior Consultation in Colombia 
Case. In Revista Derecho del Estado. Vol. 39, 2017, 137-186, 137.
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in their territories? Given this reality, an era of transnational investments 
demands international commitments. However, the interest in exploring and 
exploiting resources seems to be greater than discerning a way to prevent 
self-destruction and both, the respect and understanding of the otherness.14 
This is due to several reasons, but our understanding of these cultures and 
their environment is not yet clear. To give an example, ethnobotanists such 
as Richard Evans Schultes and those who have followed his legacy, have 
demonstrated that the elders of some communities are virtually living en-
cyclopaedias.15 
GRAPH 1
RATIFICATIONS OF C169-1989 AND C107-1957 INDIGENOUS
AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION 
Source: Author’s elaboration from the database normlex available at: www.ilo.org
(Created with mapchart.net). 
Therefore, in most of the cases, the protection of indigenous is not only a 
defence of those groups, but it also concerns holistic preservation of customs, 
animals and all that a delicate balance with the environment entails.16 In this 
context, the transformative potential of law plays a key role to go beyond the 
14  Mainstream models can be balanced with a counter-hegemonic conception of multicul-
turalism. See rodríguez-garavito, C. Ethnicity.gov: Global Governance, Indigenous Peoples, 
and the Right to Prior Consultation in Social Minefields. In Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies. Vol. 18, No. 1, 2011, 263-305, 304. 
15  One proof of this point could be the explicit message in davis, W. One River: Explora-
tions and Discoveries in the Amazon Rain Forest. London: Vintage Books, 2014; and the movie 
that influenced it: Embrace of the Serpent (directed by Ciro Guerra, 2015), which was nominated 
and/or awarded prizes in several film festivals.
16  “In the Amazon, nature teaches classes about diversity. The natives recognize ten distinct 
types of soils, eighty varieties of plants, forty-three species of ant and three hundred species of 
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traditional understanding of international law or even anthropocentric and 
ethnocentric constitutionalism.
2. TRANSFORMATIVE CASE LAW OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT  
OF HUMANS RIGHTS (IACTHR)
The jurisprudence of the iaCtHR has played a vital role in protecting the rights 
of communities by establishing a relevant standard of protection under the 
perspective of transformative constitutionalism.17 The case law of the Court 
calls for this prominent level of protection and the imperative to recognize 
fPiC. The spectrum of protection must consider the particularities of each in-
digenous and afro-descendant group and different methods of relating to the 
territory as well as their own objectives and conception of multiple variables. 
iaCtHR case law deals with legal issues and fundamental rights violations 
associated with interventions by private or public parties in protected ter-
ritories, including for instance extractive activities, “development projects” 
and governmental decisions.
TABLE 1
CASE LAW OF THE IACTHR REGARDING PRIOR CONSULTATION  
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS  
AND THE PROTECTION OF THEIR TERRITORIES
Case year Core issue deCision
1 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua
2001 Roads and deforestation Granted 
2 Yakye Axa v. Paraguay 2005 Ancestral lands and displacement Granted
3 Moiwana v. Suriname 2005 Displacement and dignity Granted
4 Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay 2006 Farming and traditional lands Granted
5 Saramaka v. Suriname*
(Leading case) 
2007 Dam, deforestation and gold mining Granted
6 Xámok Kásek v. Paraguay 2010 Ancestral lands and natural reserve Granted
7 Kichwa de Sarayaku v. Ecuador* 2012 Petroleum extraction Granted
8 Kuna and Emberá v. Panamá 2014 Dam and irregular occupation Granted
birds in just one kilometre.” galeano, E. El cazador de historias. Madrid: Siglo xxi, 2016, 33. 
(Own translation). 
17  “Transformative constitutionalism seeks to remake a country’s (supposedly deficient) 
political and social institutions by moving them closer to the sets of principles, values, and 
practices found in the constitutional text.” landau, D. A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role. In 
Boston College Law Review. Vol. 55, No. 5, 2014, 1535.
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Case year Core issue deCision
9 Garífuna Punta Piedra 
Community and its Members v. 
Honduras*
2015 Illegal occupation of territories and 
lack of protection 
Granted
10 Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz 
Community and its Members v. 
Honduras*
2015 Delimitation and protection of 
territories 
Granted
11 Kaliña and Lokono Peoples v. 
Suriname*
2015 Ancestral lands and extractive 
industries 
Granted
Source: Author’s compilation from the database available at: www.corteidh.or.cr/ (January, 2018).
The iaCtHR has ruled on prior consultation directly in the cases marked with 
the asterisk (*) in Table 1. However, the table also contains the judgments 
in which the court studied issues regarding the protection of territories of 
indigenous peoples and afro-descendants due to the rich consideration and 
connection with the territorial interest of the protected groups. Due to the 
structure of the Inter-American system, contrary to that in Europe, the Com-
mission decides which cases should be studied by the iaCtHR. This “filter” 
and the severity of the violations may explain why in all the cases studied, 
the Inter-american judges have declared the international responsibility of 
the states and granted the protection. 
Regarding the substance of the protection, the Court of the american con-
tinent applies Article 25 of the Convention related to the right to an effective 
remedy. On the other hand, applied Article 22 concerning free movement. 
While in Articles 4-5 connected the often-violated rights to both life and 
physical integrity. Taking into consideration the infringement of those rights, 
especially of acquired rights of communities over land that has been inhabited 
since ancient times, the iaCtHR has ordered that states should change legisla-
tion and administrative statutes to protect the collective rights. Furthermore, 
the Court has stressed that in recognizing the violation of the right to prior 
consultation, it allows for reparations—both material and symbolic—to the 
affected populations.18 
Within the case law lines of the iaCtHR,19 one decision stands out as a 
leading case: the Saramaka v. Suriname ruling of 2007.20 Here, the Court 
studied its own precedent and proceeded to solve the problem of the indig-
18  CorneJo Chávez, L. New Remedial Responses in the Practice of Regional Human Rights 
Courts: Purposes beyond Compensation. In International Journal of Constitutional Law. Vol. 
15, No. 2, 2017, 372-392. 
19  An excellent study of the case law before the Saramaka case, see PasqualuCCi, J. M. 
The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System. 
In Human Rights Law Review. Vol. 6, No. 2, 2006, 281-322, 281. 
20  iaCthr. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007, Series C, No. 172.
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enous community of this South American State, which authorized several 
interventions in their territories, such as a dam, deforestation and mining. 
Representatives of the community claimed that Suriname ignored the consent 
of the Saramaka peoples in making high impact changes in their territories, 
such as: (a) the number of people displaced in the area; (b) the lack of com-
pensation to be awarded to those who were displaced; (c) the lack of access 
to electricity; (d) the painful effects of the dam; (e) the reduction of natural 
resources; (f) the destruction of sacred sites; (g) the lack of respect for the 
remains of deceased ancestors; among others. 
The decision relates to the standards that underscore a variety of areas, 
not only to the relevance of simple prior consultation. More than that, the 
iaCtHR declares that states should: (i) protect effective participation of the 
indigenous community in accordance with their customs and traditions, 
regarding the development process, investment, exploration or extraction in 
their territory; (ii) guarantee that indigenous communities receive benefits 
from interventions in their territories; and (iii) ensure that no concessions 
will be made in the territories of protected communities unless a previous 
environmental and social plan is in place. However, the most important part 
of the decision (iv) determined that these conditions would be applied in 
all cases involving large-scale investment, which have the greatest impact 
within the territory of protected populations. For that reason, according to 
customs and specific traditions, it is the duty of the state not only to consult 
the communities but also to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.21 
In conclusion, on some occasions, indigenous peoples and afro-descendants 
of Latin America must address interventions with profound social and economic 
challenges. Loss of their traditional lands, eviction, migration, depletion of 
resources and destruction and pollution of the traditional environment, are just 
a few examples. The Saramaka case built a comprehensive path for protection 
that has been confirmed in subsequent cases.22 In the case of Xámok Kásek 
v. Paraguay (2010), the iaCtHR referred to the Saramaka precedent on 14 
occasions; in Sarayaku v. Ecuador (2012) and Garífuna Punta Piedra Com-
munity and its Members v. Honduras (2015), each case quoted the Saramaka 
decision around 20 times. However, in more recent litigation, the Kaliña and 
Lokono Peoples v. Suriname (2015) case made more than 70 direct references 
to the Saramaka case and profoundly has shaped the relevance of consent to 
effectively protect the rights involved. 
Saramaka, stands as a landmark case which strives for systematic pro-
tection of indigenous autonomy and self-governance under a multicultural 
21  Ibid. at paras. 133-137. 
22  See sChönsteiner, J.; Beltrán y Puga, A. and lovera, D. A. Reflections on the Human 
Rights Challenges of Consolidating Democracies: Recent Developments in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights. In Human Rights Law Review. Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011, 362-389, 382-383.
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perspective.23 Since that precedent was first set, decisions of communities 
should not just be “considered” or “socialized”. Additionally, there is a “right 
to consultation, and where applicable, a duty to obtain consent”.24 The ef-
fects of this jurisprudence are even beyond the Latin American region and 
are possible to see an emergence of a Dialogue between Regional Systems 
and with International Human Right Regime. 
For instance, a mutual reinforcement has been pointed out between the 
interamerican system and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (undriP) and the direction of the UN Special Rapporteur 
who is also interpreting the fPiC requirement in the mentioned declaration. 
Indeed, it is arguably the adoption of the undriP that has propelled the transi-
tion towards greater recognition of fPiC within International, Regional and 
National mechanisms and courts.25 On the other hand, the African system (both 
the Commission and the Court) has relied on some interamerican precedents 
to start building their own precedents in the region.26 
3. TRANSFORMATIVE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  
OF COLOMBIA
3.1. Contextualization
Constitutional scholars have shown increased interest in the proactivism of 
the Constitutional Court of Colombia27 and the transformative role of the 
justices.28 As a matter of fact, prior consultation and indigenous rights are 
23  What roles has the concept of multiculturalism played in human rights discourse? A 
powerful answer can be found in mCgoldriCk, D. Multiculturalism and its Discontents. In Hu-
man Rights Law Review. Vol. 5, No. 1, 2005, 27-56, 27. 
24  For a detailed analysis of the judgment, see olivares, E. Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
and the Extractive Industry: Jurisprudence from the Inter-American System of Human Rights. 
In Gottingen Journal of International Law. Vol. 5, No. 1, 2013, 187-204, 187. 
25  See rodríguez-Pinero, L. The Inter-American System and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Mutual Reinforcement. In allen, S. and xanthaki, A. (Eds.). 
Reflections on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. London: Hart Publish-
ing, 2011, 457-484; Barelli, M. Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead. In The 
International Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 16, No. 1, 2012, 1-24. 
26  See among others saul, B. Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights: International and 
Regional Jurisprudence. London: Bloomsbury, 2016, 163, or the recent wasted opportuniity in 
the case of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya, Applica-
tion No. 006/2012, Judgment 26, May, 2017.
27  landau, D. The Two Discourses in Colombian Constitutional Jurisprudence: A New 
Approach to Modeling Judicial behavior in Latin America. In George Washington International 
Law Review. Vol. 37, No. 3, 2005, 687-744, 736.
28  uPrimny, R. The Enforcement of Social Rights by the Colombian Constitutional Court: 
Cases and Debates. In gargarella, R. and roux, T. (Eds.), Courts and Social Transformation 
in New Democracies: An Institutional Voice for the Poor? Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006, 127. 
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one of the examples where it is possible to find a good example of vigorous 
commitment to transformative constitutionalism.29 
In Colombia, before the Constitution of 1991 populations such as (i) in-
digenous, (ii) Afro-Colombians, (iii) Raizales islanders, (iv) Palenqueras and 
(v) Roma were constitutionally dismissed as independent or special groups 
or just “People outside the Constitution”.30 After the independence(s), these 
historical peoples were voluntarily and/or involuntarily compelled to reside 
in peripheral areas such as the Amazon region in the south, the Pacific coast 
in the west and the Caribbean in the north. In addition, the “developing” 
process enforced and commanded from major cities, such as Bogotá with 
more than eight pain the centre of the country, Medellin with 3.7 million in 
the north-west, Cali with 2.9 million in the south or Barranquilla with 1.8 
million in the north represents a direct threat for the protected populations.31 
Moreover, the past 50 years have seen increasingly rapid advances and 
developments in those centres of industrial production both in the national 
and international sphere. Overpopulation and other factors linked to devel-
opment had created a two-pronged problem. On the one hand, national and 
transnational actors are exploring or exploiting natural resources in areas 
where these types of communities had been living for centuries. In addition, 
the cyclical violence of the country in some cases and the western influence 
in others are pushing some groups or families to move from small rural 
communities to urban areas.32 These dramatic changes often result in a very 
inadequate quality of life and in most of the cases a quick push over the edge 
to homelessness for people who are just barely surviving.33
29  CePeda, M. J. and landau, D. Colombian Constitutional Law: Leading Cases. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 241. 
30  gargarella, R. “We the People” outside of the Constitution: The Dialogic Model of 
Constitutionalism and the System of Checks and Balances. In Current Legal Problems. Vol. 67, 
No. 1, 2014, 1-47. 
31  The total population of Colombia by 2005 was 42,888,592; the 2017 projection is 
around 49,000,000. Indigenous communities are approximately 3.43% of the total population; 
10.62%, Afro-Colombians; 0.01%, Roma; and 85.94%, classified as non-ethnic. Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (dane). Colombia, una nación multicultural, su diversidad 
étnica. Bogotá: dane, 2007.
32  Around 50% of Latin American indigenous peoples have moved to urban centres. 
See, World Bank. Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-first Century: The First Decade. 
Washington: World Bank Group, 2015, 17-27.
33  For instance, the case of the Nukak Maku community. More than 50% of the popula-
tion has been displaced from their traditional nomadic territories due to the armed conflict or 
to the action of settlers. The population is estimated at about 450-550 survivors. stavenhagen, 
R. Peasants, Culture and Indigenous Peoples: Critical Issues. Heidelberg: Springer-Colegio de 
México, 2013, 151-152.
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3.2. Constitutional and legal protection34
The Constitution of Colombia of 1991 has provisions which directly protect 
indigenous peoples and creates the perfect platform for the participation rights 
of these types of groups who have historically been subjected to discrimina-
tion. The most relevant are: Article 7 (ethnic and cultural diversity), Article 
10 (language), Article 40 (rights of citizen participation), Article 171 (senators 
elected in a special national constituency for indigenous communities) and 
Articles 246, 286, 287, 329 and 330 (Indigenous territories as administrative 
entities; faculties within local authorities, management, judicial jurisdiction 
and development of policies). The constitutional ranking of these particulari-
ties was tantamount to a small revolution and strategically developed relevant 
aspects of the ilo Convention 169/1989.
Article 330 provides the main source of connection between prior consulta-
tion and the rights of the indigenous peoples. According to the Constitution, 
councils formed by and regulated according to their traditions shall govern 
native territories. As a result, councils should exercise the following func-
tions of this decalogue:
TABLE 2
PRIOR CONSULTATION AND THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
IN ARTICLE 330 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA
(i) Implement regulations of land uses and settlement of their territories
(ii) Design the policies, plans and programmes of economic and social development within 
their territory, in accordance with the National Development Plan
(iii) Promote public investments in their territories and ensure their proper implementation
(iv) Collect and distribute their resources
(v) Ensure the preservation of natural resources
(vi) Coordinate the programmes and projects promoted by the different communities in their 
territory
(vii) Collaborate with the maintenance of public order within their territory in accordance with 
the instructions and provisions of the national government
(viii) Represent the territories before the national government and other entities to which they 
are members
34  All the references to the Colombian Constitution and case law in general are translated 
by the author. References to the case law of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, hereinafter 
[CCC], will be identified under the style used for the tribunal, e.g. [CCC] T-129/11 easily found 
at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co (The decisions are hyperlinked in the Tables 3 and 4 in the 
Appendix of this paper). 
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(ix) Attend to matters stipulated by the Constitution and the law
(x) Exploit natural resources without harm to the cultural, social and economic integrity of 
indigenous communities
Source: Author’s compilation.
Article 330 is at the heart of jurisprudential and constitutional understand-
ing of the right to consultation. According to the mandate of the constituent 
power, “exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories shall be 
done without harming the cultural, social and economic integrity of indigenous 
communities. The decisions taken with respect to such types of exploitation 
in their territories must be encouraged by the government and coordinated 
with the representatives of the respective communities”.35 
The constitutionalization of the extensive guarantees described, intro-
duced an important protection instrument and legitimatization mechanism 
for indigenous peoples and afro-descendants, somehow vindicating centuries 
of systematic violations of their rights and lands. In sum, for the very first 
time, Colombia recognized its own national and regional reality as well as 
the fact of being a multicultural State.36 
Regarding legal reforms, the most relevant debate about prior consultation 
is the regulation of the right as fundamental and the determination of whether 
a so-called veto power exists. Thus, from that perspective, the Ley Estatutaria 
or Statutory Act merits obligatory discussion. This act constitutes a special 
law that demands an absolute majority to pass legislation in Congress and a 
legislative period of one year. Subsequently, legislation passed is subject to 
mandatory review before the Constitutional Court.
The Colombian government, the private sector, several civil and leader-
ship organizations are trying to discuss a draft, which is paradoxically stalled 
due to the lack of prior consultation. However, the solution is not per se the 
regulation.37 In the following sections, this research will show the basic ele-
ments or standard that should be considered in future legislation in Colom-
bia and why not in other countries or systems. Following the ius commune 
35  See the paragraph in Article 330, Colombian Constitution, 1991. 
36  “These ideas challenge previously dominate western conceptions of the cultural homo-
geneous and legally monolithic state.” anaya, J. S. International Human Rights and Indigenous 
Peoples: The Move toward the Multicultural State. In Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law. Vol. 21, No. 1, 2004, 61. 
37  At least the conclusions that have come from Peru are not the optimal: “We have found 
that the actual influence exerted by the groups consulted on the content of the law and the decree 
was very limited.” sChilling-vaCaflor, A. and flemmer, R. Conflict Transformation through 
Prior Consultation? Lessons from Peru. In Journal of Latin American Studies. Vol. 47, No. 4, 
2015, 811-839, 835. Regarding context, see Wright, C. Indigenous Mobilisation and the Law of 
Consultation in Peru: A Boomerang Pattern? In The International Indigenous Policy Journal. 
Vol. 5, No. 4, 2014.
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proposal,38 it will reconstruct the principal outcomes from the case law of the 
Colombian and the Inter-American Court, demonstrating how and why this 
judicial dialogue has developed –the most balanced standard of protection 
regarding prior consultation–.
 3.3. Review of legislation (abstract control)
Abstract control is complex due to the difficulties in explaining and deter-
mining what exactly should be consulted with the communities regarding 
regulations. A complete list of cases which review legislation can be found 
in Table 3 located in the appendix of this study. The Graph 2 shows only 
two cases of 41 (5%), where the Constitutional Court set aside parts of the 
legislation which directly affects the right to prior consultation and merely 
five cases (12%) in which the whole regulation was reviewed. Consequently, 
it declared unconstitutional or dismissed prior consultation during the process 
of discussion and debate of the law-making process. 
GRAPH 2. CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF COLOMBIA 
RELATED TO PRIOR CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES  
AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS (25 YEARS).  
ABSTRACT CONTROL OR REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
Inhibition
(1 case)
2%
Constitutional 
(33 cases)
81%
Unconstitutional 
(5 cases)
12%
Partially
Unconstitutional 
(2 cases)
12%
Source: Author’s elaboration from the database available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co  
See details in the appendix (table 3). 
38  iCCal “belief in the transformative potential of law, if properly embedded in broader 
social processes. Moreover, it builds on and reconstructs the wealth of judicial activity with a 
transformative agenda.” von Bogdandy et al. Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America, 
cit., 19.
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Contrary to the variety of critics who consider prior consultation a prob-
lematic issue for mainstream development model and the “general interest”39, 
in more than 80% of the cases reviewed (33 cases), the Court has found the 
regulation made by the Parliament to be constitutional (see Graph 2). On just 
one occasion, “inhibition or dismissal” was the mechanism to reject the study 
of legal action due to the mediocre quality of the litigation (2%). Decision 
C-030/08 stands out as clearly the most important and comprehensive prec-
edent related to the abstract control of legislation and the fundamental right 
to prior consultation.40 In the words of the Court itself in a 2013 decision: 
Judgment C-030 of 2008 re-conceptualizes the jurisprudential line and makes 
progress in establishing the requirements and characteristics of prior consultation. 
That is, it stands on the main precedent in this area, as it consolidates the standard 
in the implementation of prior consultation in the legislative process, to guarantee 
the realization of the right of such communities to participate in decisions that 
directly affect them.41 
To interpret the content and scope of the legislative measures in specific 
cases, the leading case C-030/2008 distinguished between the direct impact 
on indigenous peoples and afro-descendants and impact on the colombian 
society as a whole. For instance, mining regulation affects all Colombian 
citizens. However, if there is a chapter or article that mentions or exclusively 
affects indigenous peoples and afro-descendants, the CCC reviews whether 
during the legislative process the protected communities were consulted or not. 
Consequently, it has applied several hermeneutical methods: (i) textual 
interpretation of the regulatory body; (ii) systematic interpretation; (iii) histori-
cal interpretation; (iv) contextual interpretation including the precedents and 
the controversies around the ruling process; and (v) teleological interpretation. 
In short, the key element here is the direct impact of the regulation on the 
interests of the community. In those cases, where it is possible to prove or 
find lack of prior consultation, the jurisprudence has declared some articles 
or the whole law to be unconstitutional; once again, only in 17% of the cases 
studied in 25 years. In the other more than 80%, it has declared the regula-
tion to be constitutional.
In the cases marked in Table 3 with an asterisk (* see appendix), the Court 
declares the constitutionality laying out additional specifications to be con-
sidered in the implementation or given the framework of the interpretation 
39  La satanización de la consulta previa [The demonization of prior consultation]. [En 
línea]. In El Espectador. 25 February 2016. Available at: http://www.elespectador.com/opinion/
editorial/satanizacion-de-consulta-previa-articulo-618787
40  Some specific cases are explained in Section 4.4.3 of CCC C-196/12. For a summary in 
English, see CePeda and landau. Colombian Constitutional Law, cit., 2017, 264-270. 
41  CCC. C-253/13. 
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under tutela case law principles. Decision C-389/16, the last one of the case 
law period studied, is an excellent example of how it is possible to solidify 
binding consent. This decision recapitulates the leading case of abstract 
control and links constitutionality with the considerations of the leading 
case of concrete control, T-129/11 and the other decisions related to direct 
interventions in the territories of the communities. The Grand Chamber of the 
Court establishes in the holding of decision C-389/16 the following important 
remark regarding measures to be considered during direct interventions on 
the protected territories: 
The Grand Chamber will therefore declare Articles 122, 124 and 133 of the 
Mining Code to be enforceable, on the understanding that it is constitutionally 
admissible only if it is considered that ethnic communities shall be consulted in 
relation to mining projects likely to affect them directly (C-371/14, T-129/11, 
T-769/09, among many others). And if, in accordance with that which has been 
explained in the preceding paragraphs, decisions that directly and intensely affect 
their rights can be only implemented if they obtain the prior, free and informed 
consent of the communities.
To summarize, the Grand Chamber upholds the commitment to judicial 
dialogue with the iaCtHR and international instruments, especially with the 
balanced standard established in decisions T-769/09 and T-129/11 and the 
many others that reinforce and solidify the case law of the CCC or what D. 
Bonilla has properly coined the “pluralistic multicultural model”.42 
3.4. The tutela decisions (concrete control)
In situations regarding enforcement of constitutional rights, or acciones de 
tutela, on several occasions, the Constitutional Court has studied problems 
where indigenous peoples and afro-descendants had to address violation of 
their territories or the exploitation of natural resources, both by private and/
or public actors. Table 4 in the appendix shows the case law of the CCC in 
detail regarding direct interventions (concrete control) in territories protected 
by prior consultation or summarised in Graph 3.
42  “This model appeals to a pluralistic structure of the state as well as to intercultural 
equality, corrective justice, self-government rights, and cultural integrity in order to justify and 
give content to the right to prior consultation.” Bonilla. Constitutionalism of the Global South, 
cit., 2013, 35.
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GRAPH 3. CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
OF COLOMBIA RELATED TO PRIOR CONSULTATION 
OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS (25 YEARS). 
CONCRETE CONTROL OR “TUTELAS”
Annulled
(1 case)
1%
Granted
(62 cases)
76%
Rejected
(5 cases)
6%
Denied 
(14 cases)
17%
Source: Author’s compilation from the database available at: corteconstitucional.gov.co/  
See details in the appendix (Table 4). 
In the five rejected cases (6%), the jurisprudence pointed out that tutela was 
not the proper mechanism for the specific case. Finally, in just one case, the 
court annulled the decision, due to the inappropriate configuration of the 
parties in conflict. In short, 24% of the cases were somehow negative to the 
claim of protection and in 76% of the judgments, the Court found that the 
violation of the right to prior consultation existed and ordered the protec-
tion. According to these results, it is possible to affirm that once the court 
decides to review a case, there is a high probability that it will rule in favour 
or protecting indigenous peoples and afro-descendants’ rights. 
Equally important, this study separates the macro and micro interven-
tions to show the different scales of situations that peoples protected by 
ilo 169 are facing in Colombia. It further demonstrates the type of cases 
that have been selected and ruled on by the CCC (see Graphs 4 and 5). The 
dividing line between the categories comes from the scale or impact of the 
interventions.
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GRAPH 4. CASE LAW OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
RELATED TO PRIOR CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS (25 YEARS).  
MACRO INTERVENTIONS IN CONCRETE CONTROL
Infraestructure: Roads, dams, ports, etc.
Extractive industries: Mining, oil
exploitation, etc.
Others
23
17
5
Source: Author’s elaboration from the database available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co See details in 
the appendix (table 4). 
Infrastructure projects or interventions related to roads, dams, ports, and large 
scale projects interferences aroused the attention of the Court 23 times (see 
Graph 4). Moreover, extractive industries were the reason for the Court to 
intervene on 17 occasions. In addition, five cases concerning the construction 
of a military base and towers or the use of tutela to stop a legislative process. 
In total 45 macro interventions, cases were ruled on.
GRAPH 5. CASE LAW OF THE COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL  
COURT RELATED TO PRIOR CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES  
AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS (25 YEARS).  
MICRO INTERVENTIONS IN CONCRETE CONTROL
Others
Ethno-educators
Small infrastructure
Territorial integrity issues
Ethno-educators
16
7
7
7
Source: Author’s compilation from the database available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co 
See details in the appendix (table 4). 
Furthermore, the Court studied 37 micro interventions on issues related to 
territorial integrity and ruled on seven cases (see Graph 5). It also reviewed 
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small infrastructure constructions such as a water waste or luxury small ho-
tel and spa in Providencia island (seven similar cases). Additionally, (seven 
cases) of ethno-educators without the authorization of the communities to 
teach in their territories, and other cases such as the relocation of an informal 
salesperson on a private beach or a mobile radio station in indigenous ter-
ritories (16 different cases). This division of macro and micro interventions 
as well shows that the fPiC of the communities should be checked without 
regard for the scale of the intervention according to the arguments that follow. 
4. THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS OF COLOMBIAN CASE LAW
As previously mentioned, this article does not provide an empirical review 
on how to implement the right(s) to prior consultation. However, this section 
of the study complements and critically annotates the doctrinal approach of 
D. Bonilla to construct and bolster the understanding of the case law. Bonilla 
considers that the jurisprudence of the court regarding prior consultation has 
gone through three main stages. The stages are as follows: (i) multicultural 
liberal monism, where the Court separates consent and consultation SU-
039/97; (ii) procedural liberal monism: that is to say that the jurisprudence 
locates prior consultation within a monist structure of the state, and argues 
that fPiC is not a component of this right (for instance, C-030/08, C-615/09, 
C-175/09, among others); and (iii) multicultural liberal pluralism in which 
cultural integrity and self-governance are related to the right to veto and this 
right is linked to a pluralist interpretation pro homine (initiated by T-769/09 
and extensively explained in case T-129/11).43 
At the time of his book’s publication in 2013, Bonilla had studied 23 
cases. In this current study (see Tables 3 and 4 in the appendix), 82 tutela 
decisions and 41 regarding review of legislation, a total of 123 cases, are 
studied. However, the categories are still valid with the modifications that 
this analysis presents and clarifies on the matter. It includes SU-133/17 which 
confirmed and amalgamated the concrete and abstract control decisions that 
the CCC has developed in 25 years of case law and protection of indigenous 
peoples and afro-descendants right to prior and informed consultation. This 
case confirmed the ratio decidendi of case C-389/11 and Decision T-129/11 
and the other cases that developed their principles. Additionally, the principal 
43  44 of 64 (concrete control) and six of 23 (abstract control) decisions of the [CCC] issued 
after the publication of T-129/11, have quoted or applied the standards derived from that landmark 
precedent until the end of 2016: cfr. (T-601/11, T-693/11, T-698/11, C-882/11, T-376/12, C-395/12, 
T-513/12, T-514/12, C-641/12, T-680/12, T-693/12, T-993/12, T-1080/12, T-049/13, C-068/13, 
T-245/13, T-172/13, T-300/13, T-657/13, T-858/13, T-204/14, T-294/14, T-353/14, C-371/14, T-
384A/14, T-396/14, T-461/14, T-462A-14, T-646/14, T-800/14, T-849/14, T-969/14, T-247/15, 
T-256/15, T-438/15, T-485/15, T-550/15, T-660/15, T-661/15, T-766/15, T-005/16, T-197/16), 
C-389/16, T-213/16, T-226/16, T-288A/16, T-436/16, T-475/16, T-530/16 and T-704/16.
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message behind this kind of “SU” unification judgment is to clarify or correct 
contradictory judgments or dicta in specific cases. 44 Also, a reason to draw 
an objective time limit for this research. 
4.1. Why Decision T-129/11 is transformative?
The situation surrounding Decision T-129/11 involved a mixture of prob-
lems related to the Emberá katío community located near the border with 
Panama. The community was facing the construction of the Pan-American 
highway, gold mining, the installation of electrical towers and the systematic 
appropriation of their territories by settlers. The Court studied the standards 
developed for the decisions listed in the appendix (see Tables 4 and 5) and 
created new ones settling an impressive dialogue with the Interamerican 
Court in the case of Saramaka v. Suriname of 2007.45
For Colombian jurisprudence, prior consultation constitutes a fundamental 
right. This category is entirely the elaboration of a former social right with its 
fundamental nature due to its multiple connections and relevance founded in 
the cases studied by the court.46 The standard (see Table 5 in the appendix) 
points out that the consultation process should be studied by the authorities 
using a strategy of differential approach. In accordance with the specific tradi-
tions of the groups involved; including the term of the consultation process 
and ingredients of each case. Apart from this, the precedent determined the 
relevance of an environmental license and archaeological management plan 
before the intervention in the protected territories.
Furthermore, an elemental concept was introduced on the grounds that 
prior consultation has been understood not only at the previous stage but 
according to subsequent revisions can be “before”, “during” and “after” 
the intervention.47 Additionally, three situations have been elaborated on, in 
which it is mandatory to pursue the fPiC. Particularly, when:
(a) it involves the removal or displacement of communities; 
(b) it involves the storage or dumping of toxic waste; and/or
(c) it represents a high social, cultural, and environmental impact on a 
community that may lead to endangering its existence and continuity.48 
44  The “SU” Sentencia de Unificación category means unification judgment that is dis-
cussed extraordinarily in the Grand Chamber. 
45  For more details, see CePeda and landau. Colombian Constitutional Law, cit., 268-270.
46  For this reason, the regulation must undergo treatment by the special law “Ley Estatu-
taria” or Statutory Act.
47  “Prior” literally means previous. Nevertheless, prior has more meanings than an indication 
of an event or situation “coming before in time.” It also means “important” and “existing”. oxford 
diCtionaries. Oxford Dictionary of English. London: Oxford University Press, 2006, 1400. 
48  The Court embraced the recommendations made by the UN Special Rapporteur James 
Anaya on the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples, made on 26 May 2011, after the prom-
ulgation of the prior consultation law in Peru. 
211Judicial Dialogue and Transformative Constitutionalism in Latin America
Revista Derecho del Estado n.º 43, mayo-agosto de 2019, pp. 191-233
When an external party cannot obtain the approval of the community in 
the events described or where the destruction or disappearance of groups is 
inferable, authorities and the communities involved in those circumstances 
must apply or claim the principle of pro homine interpretation in favour of 
the fundamental rights of the community involved.49
4.2. Is there a veto power?
Is it plausible to claim that in the situations described the pro homine interpre-
tation is a kind of veto power? D. Bonilla considers that the Court declared, 
“The right to consultation includes veto power for cultural minorities in 
certain circumstances”.50 In Bonilla’s opinion, Decision T-129/11 forms the 
cornerstone of a new so-called “pluralistic” model of approach in contrast 
to the “monistic” interpretation employed in previous decisions, what in this 
article is referred to as “binding consent.”51
Other scholars believe the opposite of Bonilla and the statement of binding 
consent. For instance: “Unfortunately, the last ruling being revised (T-129/11) 
states that prior consultation is not a veto right, which contradicts the pos-
tulates of the decision.”52 Another critic states, “It is true that consultation 
is a fundamental right; however, it does not constitute a right to veto […] 
participation does not imply veto […] [and] the right to participation could 
be confused in the popular imagination with a right to veto –and this can be 
exercised in bad faith or intended to block or delay”.53 
According to M. Yriart, the CCC “The no-veto doctrine is out of place 
with the body of the law the Court develops otherwise on the subject”.54 
49  The pro homine principle “relativizes the absolute protection of conflicting rights […] 
thereby creates an open circumstance for striking an appropriate balance most favourable to 
persons in terms of their substance”. negishi, Y. The Pro Homine Principle’s Role in Regulating 
the Relationship between Conventionality Control and Constitutionality Control. In European 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 28, No. 2, 2017, 457-481, 479-480. 
50  “Introduce an element that contradicts the interpretation that the Court had articulated 
on prior consultation in the previous two stages: the right to veto […] If no agreement is reached, 
the minority would have the right to veto; […] The Court indicates that cultural minorities have 
the right to veto.” Bonilla. Constitutionalism of the Global South, cit., 243 and 290, respectively. 
51  Binding consent as less problematic and dissimilar than “veto”. 
52  aBello, C. J. Consulta previa en casos de minería para comunidades indígenas y trib-
ales [Prior consultation of indigenous and tribal communities in mining cases]. In Traspasando 
Fronteras. No. 2, 2012, 111-124, 122. (Own translation).
53  salinas, C. E. Prior Consultation as a Mandatory Requirement within Administrative 
Content Can Directly Affect Indigenous and Tribal Communities in Colombia. In Revista Derecho 
del Estado. No. 27, 2011, 241. (Own translation).
54  yriart, M. Jurisprudence in a Political Vortex. The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Give or 
Withhold Consent to Investment and Development Projects — The Implementation of Saramaka v. 
Suriname. In haeCk, Y., ruiz-ChiriBoga, O. and BurBano, C. (Eds.), The Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights: Theory and Practice, Present and Future. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2015, 502. 
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In contrast, F. Vallejo states, “without there being a veto right, the decision 
must take into account the considerations made by traditional communities 
during the consultation process”.55
It is clear that some academic interpreters of the jurisprudence have found 
that a veto power exists in some cases and does not in others. As a former 
law clerk of the CCC under supervision and orders of Justice Jorge I. Palacio, 
I had the opportunity to draft Decision T-129/11. During the drafting pro-
cess, the issue of “veto power” was a main concern. Apart from this, the new 
standards were widely discussed.56 In fact, no passage of the decision states 
expressly that there is a veto power. What is more, in Chapter 7.1, the Court 
asked: “Is the right to free prior and informed consent a veto power?” The 
judgment answered the question, by emphasizing that the problem should 
not be put forward in terms of “who vetoes who”.57 
As G. Rubiano properly points out, the CCC suggests looking beyond 
the veto and considers the consultation as an exercise and experience of 
democratic cultural formation. However, “in cases of a negative response 
by the indigenous peoples to an initiative that they consider to be seriously 
harmful, what is exercised is the right to self-determination and not, some 
form of veto power”.58
Leaving interpretations of secondary sources aside and returning to the 
primary, there are nine opinions of the Grand Chamber that have been ex-
pressed in dicta with sparse elaboration that “a veto power does not exist 
due to the fact that no right is absolute”. See, for instance, cases C-882/11, 
C-366/11, C-367/11, C-937/11, C-331/12, C-540/12, C-068/13, C-253/13 and 
C-371/14. Amongst these, only case C-641/12, specified “the impossibility 
of drawing a uniform rule in this regard”. Fortunately, the last decision of 
the Grand Chamber C-389/16 and in fact the one that closed the period of 
the justices from the years 2009-2017, clarified possible doubts about the 
issue.59 According to the Court, the implementation of a measure that directly 
and intensely affects the fundamental rights of indigenous peoples “is inad-
missible without their consent, not by the now obsolete discussion on the 
55  valleJo, F. Prior Consultation Process in the Judgments of the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia. In Revista de Estudios Constitucionales. Vol. 14, 2016, 169.
56  Specially, with Mauricio Dueñas and law clerks of other chambers such as Clara E. 
Reales, Aquiles Arrieta and Armin Sattler. 
57  CCC. T-129/11, Section 7. 
58  Padilla ruBiano, G. Consulta previa en Colombia y sus desarrollos jurisprudenciales. 
Una lectura desde los pueblos indígenas, las empresas y el Estado [Prior consultation in Colom-
bia and its case law developments. A reading from the indigenous peoples, businesses and the 
state]. In steiner, C. (Ed.), Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano 19. Bogotá: 
Universidad del Rosario and Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, 2013, 364-365. (Own translation). 
59  These criteria can also be founded in CCC Decisions T-530/16 and T-704/16, among 
others.
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existence or not of a right to a veto, but because it is openly unreasonable 
and disproportionate”.
Veto creates the impression of an arbitrary barrier, which does not require reasons 
to impose itself against other points of view and ways of action and, therefore, 
does not seem to respond adequately to the meaning that inspires consultation, 
conceived as a dialogue in good faith, among equals, and aimed to reach agree-
ments that take into account the environmental, social and economic impacts of 
a measure, in an attempt to reconcile different conceptions of development.60
Overall, Bonilla’s doctrinal and philosophical reconstruction still plays a key 
role because the leading case T-129/11 complemented by T-376/12,61 states 
clearly that the interpretation and application of the Constitution62 must be 
decided according to pro homine and proportionality principles. In some cases, 
conceivable consequences may include both freezing the intervention process 
or not. Therefore, it is important to apply these principles and standards to 
the specific ingredients of each case. For example, learning from the solution 
of Decision T-129/11, if it is possible to relocate a road without harming the 
community, there is no way to consider binding consent. If the impact of a 
specific mining project does affect the community in terms of displacement, 
toxic waste and/or high impact or that may lead to endangering its existence 
and continuity, there may be place to a binding consent.63
4.3. Why are the outcomes of the case law at risk?
Twice the CCC has exhorted Congress and the Presidency of the Republic to 
exercise their constitutional and legal powers to regulate and through their 
competent bodies to materialize the fundamental right of prior consultation 
taking into account the jurisprudence of the tribunal.64 The government’s 
answer is the current draft of the bill or “Statutory Act” that will regulate 
the fundamental right of prior consultation and unclear the development of 
several international instruments and the CCC case law. 
However, in Articles 13.c, 14.e and 22, it contemplates that prior con-
sultation “does not entail a veto power of the legislative or administrative 
60  CCC. C-389/16. 
61  CCC. T-376/12 makes a remark in the leading case T-129/11 applying the principle of 
proportionality to clarify and balance the participation of the communities in the process of 
consultation. See, considerations 25-31 of the T-376/12 judgment. 
62  Especially the executive power. 
63  Debates in relation to the veto power is also being addressed in international fora as 
well as in other jurisdictions. See doyle, C. Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and 
Resources: The Transformative Role of Free, Prior and Informed Consent. London: Routledge, 
2015, 161-167. 
64  See the resolution part of CCC Decisions T-129/11 and C-317/12. 
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situations under consultation” and the duration of the process cannot be over 
six months (Article 40).65 Deciding whether the sword of veto power is in the 
hand of indigenous peoples or not is a path that will take several efforts to 
find a proportional solution for this complex issue. Future regulation and the 
cases before the colombian court will have to be reviewed by a completely 
new body. In 2017, the CCC changed four justices: Calle, Palacio, Pretelt and 
Vargas who have openly protected the right to prior consultation. Four cur-
rent justices, Guerrero,66 Linares,67 Lizarazo68 and Ortiz,69 differ in various 
restrictive scales to the criteria of the transformative leading cases explained. 
In the regional arena, regarding the opinions of other relevant national courts 
for the indigenous rights, the Plurinational Constitutional Court of Bolivia in 
an obiter dictum, asserted that in the three exceptional cases of pro homine 
protection “the consent of indigenous peoples should be obtained, which 
means that in such cases the peoples have the power to veto the project”.70 
In contrast, the Constitutional Court of Peru expressed that “the right to 
consultation does not imply a right to veto for indigenous peoples”.71
This study presents the work of 25 years of one of the most proactive and 
well-known courts in the world. Precisely the decisions regarding protection 
of indigenous peoples and other groups are one of the examples that have put 
this curious and peripheric South American tribunal on the global map.72 A 
unique version of magic realism in Court that links transformative and dialogic 
constitutionalism to plausible results. If the Court does not improve it, the 
case law accomplished under the progressive realization and non-regression 
principle should at least respect it. However, the pressure of the media and 
other actors is evident.73 
The Colombian government has shown a restrictive approach breaking the 
consensus of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
65  “Prior Consultation Act”, Ministerio del Interior de Colombia, Version 6 November 
2016. 
66  CCC. SU-133/17.
67  CCC. Dissenting opinion of Decision C-389/16 and SU-133/17. 
68  CCC. Dissenting opinion of Decision SU-133/17. 
69  CCC. Decision T-313/16.
70  Decision 2003/2010-R, consideration iii (2010). 
71  Case of Gonzalo Tuanama Tunanma y más de 5.000 ciudadanos v. Decreto legislativo 
n.º 1089, exp. 0022-2009-PI/TC, consideration viii, 24 and 25 (2009). To understand the context 
of prior consultation in Bolivia, see sChilling-vaCaflor, A. Prior Consultations in Plurinational 
Bolivia: Democracy, Rights and Real Life Experiences. In Latin American and Caribbean Eth-
nic Studies. Vol. 8, No. 2, 2013, 202-220; shaW, J. Indigenous Veto Power in Bolivia. In Peace 
Review. Vol. 29, No. 2, 2017, 231-238.
72  See CePeda and landau. Colombian Constitutional Law, cit.
73  La Corte Constitucional versus los empresarios [The Constitutional Court versus busi-
nessmen]. In Semana. 15 October 2016. Available at: https://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/
fallos-del-la-corte-constitucional-impactan-el-desarrollo-economico-en-las-regiones/499115
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in the regional sphere,74 pointing out in the national sphere that prior consul-
tation is a “a headache”75 or an “extortion mechanism”.76 Taking the current 
legal and jurisprudential level of protection in Colombia into consideration, 
it is possible to conclude that the tribunal has shown a strong commitment 
to the protection of indigenous peoples and afro-descendants.
Nevertheless, most of the work falls on the shoulders of the Constitutional 
Court and the protection before this institution should be the ultima ratio or 
last resort scenario. Innovative solutions in the coming years should consider 
prevention, in the two extremes of solution that exist and avoid what Gar-
garella denominates the problem of translation or the tendency “to simplify 
what is normally too complex; it represents an attempt to solve problems 
that are mainly non-juridical through juridical means”.77 
5. AN EMBLEMATIC EXAMPLE OF DIALOGUE AND TRANSFORMATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM
The term dialogue denotes the exchange of arguments to reach an agreement. 
Likewise, the notion translates into conversation, discussion or discourse, 
terminology widely accepted in the literature of the supranational European 
context. The dialogic relationship can be descriptive or explanatory or it 
may give regulations to provide a common understanding of law.78 In other 
words is the “communication between courts derived from an obligation to 
consider the case of another Court (foreign or from another legal system) 
to apply in one’s own system”.79 In contrast, in Latin America is possible 
to find similar understanding regarding dialogue between Courts or other 
74  The temporary Colombian government of J. M. Santos broke the consensus of the 
permanent American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples posing false arguments 
about the case law of the CCC. Putting in quotation marks some decontextualized dicta and hinting 
with the issue, it literally stained the supranational instrument. See footnote 3 of the mentioned 
declaration. 
75  Santos dice que consultas previas y audiencias públicas “son un dolor de cabeza” 
[Santos says that prior consultations and public audiences “are a headache”]. In El Espectador. 16 
August 2013. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/santos-dice-consultas-
previas-y-audiencias-publicas-son-articulo-440645
76  “Consulta previa se volvió un mecanismo extorsivo”: Vargas Lleras [“Prior consulta-
tion became an extortion mechanism”: Vargas Lleras]. In El Tiempo. 25 April 2016. Available 
at: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/Cms-16572247
77  The judicialization of the indigenous question “runs the risk of expropriating the control 
of these decisions from the same affected communities that it wants to benefit”. gargarella. 
“We the People” outside of the Constitution, cit., 181.
78  torres, A. Conflicts of Rights in the European Union. A Theory of Supranational 
Adjudication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 106. 
79  Bustos, R. xv Proposiciones generales para una teoría de los diálogos judiciales [xv 
General proposals for a theory of judicial dialogues]. In Revista Española de Derecho Consti-
tucional. No. 95, 2012, 13-63, 21. (Own translation).
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institutions80 or a broader participation of different actors throw public hear-
ings or citizen participation in the review of legislation and understanding 
of fundamental rights.81
Considering these notions, this research is focused on in the notions of 
dialogue regarding courts nonetheless appealing for a broader understand-
ing of dialogue and dialogic mechanisms. Regarding the first notion of dia-
logue, M. Morales precisely highlights the “emblematic” relation between 
the Constitutional Court of Colombia and the iaCtHR in her reference of the 
Saramaka and T-129/11 cases. In Morales’ words, it is necessary to “explore 
how other national courts are adopting the standards of the Inter-American 
system, which essentially represents the basis of the Ius Constitutionale Com-
mune in human rights and is developed jurisprudentially”.82 Additionally, M. 
Góngora points out the “coevolutive” and “convergence of standards” in the 
case law of both courts.83 
In Colombia, the iaChr recognizes that the CCC has been fulfilling a role 
of significant importance. The commission underscores the fact that the 
Colombian tribunal has developed “rich and progressive jurisprudence”. 
Particularly, the jurisprudential development of the right to free, prior, and 
informed consent.84 
The precedents introduced by the Colombian Constitutional Court, espe-
cially in judgment T-129/11, established several advances in the standard of 
protection of prior consultation into the national case law and even expanded 
80  aCosta, P. A. Diálogo judicial y constitucionalismo multinivel: el caso interamericano. 
Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2015.
81  “The first court to engage in these kinds of dialogic practices was the Colombian Court 
[…] Latin American tribunals have demonstrated enormous creativity concerning the design and 
implementation of dialogic mechanism.” gargarella, R. Scope and Limits of Dialogic Consti-
tutionalism. In Bustamante, T. and gonçalves, B. (Eds.), Democratizing Constitutional Law: 
Perspectives on Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism. Switzerland: Springer, 
2016, 119-120. 
82  morales, M. El Estado abierto como objetivo del ius constitutionale commune [The 
open statehood as goal of the Ius Commune]. In Bogdandy, A. V; fix-fierro, H. and morales, 
M. (Eds.), Ius constitutionale commune en América Latina: rasgos, potencialidades y desafíos. 
México: unam and mPil, 2014, 283. (Own translation).
83  “The convergent trend of these processes has enormous potential to develop jurispru-
dentially an Inter-American constitutional law.” góngora, M. Diálogos jurisprudenciales entre 
la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Corte Constitucional de Colombia: una 
visión coevolutiva de la convergencia de estándares sobre derechos de las víctimas [Judicial 
dialogues between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Colombian Constitutional 
Court: A coevolutionary vision of the convergence of standards on victims’ rights]. In ferrer, E., 
Bogdandy, A. V. and morales, M. (Eds.), La justicia constitucional y su internacionalización. 
¿Hacia un ius constitutionale commune en América Latina? T. ii. México: mPil and Instituto 
Iberoamericano de Derecho Constitucional, 2010, 403. (Own translation).
84  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Human Rights Protection in the Context 
of Extraction, Exploitation, and Development Activities, oea/Ser.L/v/ii. Doc. 47/15, 31 December 
2015. Available at: www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ExtractiveIndustries2016.pdf (24.1.2018).
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in comparison with Inter-American case law. On the one hand, it paradoxi-
cally removed the conception of consultation from the sphere of “prior”. In 
other words, ilo 169/89 still limited consultation in that period dismissing 
the right and reducing the voice of the communities along the intervention 
process. On the other hand, it complemented the dialogue with the reinforce-
ment of the pro homine advantages in the most dangerous interventions.85
The conception of prior consultation in several cases was considered in a 
kind of socialization or informative meaningful process instead of a real con-
sultation scenario. After beginning consultation and intervention in protected 
territories, the affected groups” main possibility is to appeal to administra-
tive or private jurisdiction grounds by a liability process. However, highly 
paid advisors protect the interests of private or public players by delaying 
discussions or postponing the decision at the expense of the displacement of 
indigenous peoples, deforestation of land, and/or pollution of rivers.
Large corporations or public institutions conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
collateral damages related to the exploitation of natural resources or peoples 
versus the payment for destroying a river or an oral tradition of an indigenous 
community. However, with regard to moral limits, there are some issues that 
monies should not be able to buy, and every single model of development 
implies respect of moral limits.86 The principles and values that the studied 
courts are protecting are far more relevant than the archetypal western model 
of “development”. The call of the CCC and the iaCtHR in its case law is clear 
empowerment of the indigenous peoples and afro-descendant’s voice because 
it allows their voices and binding consent to be heard before, during and 
after interventions.
Alternatively, the Court reformulated the precedent of the Saramaka case 
applying a similar solution technique but implementing a clause based on the 
recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the fundamental rights 
of indigenous peoples along with the pro homine principle. Consequently, 
binding consent in cases where protected groups: (i) are threatened with 
displacement; (ii) are involved in the use of toxic substances that make it 
impossible to live in; (iii) suffer high social, cultural and environmental impact 
in a community that might lead to endangering their existence.
In these situations, it is necessary for external parties to pursue fPiC in 
which communities can determine the least harmful alternative. However, 
when exploring the least of alternatives and this process concludes that all 
are harmful, or the intervention would lead to the disappearance of commu-
nities, then the solution must ensure that the rights of protected populations 
under the principle pro homine and proportionality shall prevail. In other 
85  CCC. T-129/11, Section 8. 
86  For such an encompassing concept and several examples, see sandel, M. What Money 
Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012.
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words, in some specific circumstances a —binding consent— was ruled on. 
Therefore, the jurisprudential dialogue presented in this research permits the 
categorization according to Nogueira’s proposal as:87
(i) Receptive: as the CCC stated in the dialogue in cases T-769/09 and 
T-129/11 and literally embraced the ratio decidendi regarding the fPiC. In 
several sections of the national decision, it is possible to check how and why 
T-129/11 and further judgments stand on the shoulders of the Saramaka case. 
In fact, the CCC following the style of the iaCtHR even ordered as a symbolic 
reparation the translation of several parts of the judgment into the Emberá 
language. 
(ii) Innovative: the interpretation of the national constitution and the con-
vention offers a broader and new transformative way to protect the rights of 
indigenous peoples and afro-descendants. Establishing binding consent of the 
populations before, during, and after interventions and not just an “abstract 
right to consultation, and where applicable, a duty to obtain consent”.88
(iv) Corrective: without much argumentation, the Saramaka decision de-
termined that consent must be pursued by the states in cases of “large-scale 
development or investment”. Is this requirement plausible? Graph 5 of this 
study shows the kind of “micro” interventions that the CCC studied after De-
cision T-129/11 that fortunately has corrected the mistake. According to the 
CCC, interventions in the territories of protected populations by ilo 169/89 
should be consulted and consented.89
(iv) Extensive: partially following Nogueira’s concept of extensive. This 
analysis argues above, that the CCC has moved the Saramaka precedent and 
the iaCtHR interpretation forward as the first consideration for this type of 
dialogue. However, it is pertinent to stress that, in the last cases reviewed 
by the iaCtHR (Sarayaku v. Ecuador 2012) regarding prior consultation, 
the tribunal twice quoted the precedent T-129/11 and decisions SU-039/97, 
C-169/01, C-030/08 and T-235/11. 
In addition, the case law studied in both systems is addressing a paradox. 
The developments are modelled for the world of concepts and ideas but are 
difficult to apply without the cooperation of the other powers and external 
actors. The task of jurisprudence rich in concepts has been achieved both 
at the Inter-American and the national level in Colombia. This first stage of 
courts designed to gain legitimacy has passed and it seems to me that it is the 
moment to enforce the solutions in the sphere of economic, politic and social 
87  nogueira, H. El control de convencionalidad y el diálogo interjurisdiccional entre 
tribunales nacionales y Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Conventionality control 
and inter-jurisdictional dialogue between national Courts and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights]. In steiner, C. (Ed.), Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano 19. Bogotá: 
Universidad del Rosario and Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, 2013, 531-540.
88  See Saramaka v Suriname, 28 November 2007, cit., 40-41. 
89  See CCC Decision T-129/11, Section 7.ii, and Table 5 of the Appendix. 
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integration.90 In other words, a broad ius commune.91 With respect to this, 
fundamental rights though important and a central part of a supranational ius 
commune, they are then again not the principal, nor the only axis on which 
the Latin American legal system is built. 
Although the problem is even beyond the scope of positive law, taking into 
consideration the examples elaborated on in this article, there are complex 
violations of fundamental rights linked with prior consultation. The iaCtHR 
and the CCC on paper offer a high protection standard but achieving that level 
of protection in several of the real cases is still a challenge. This is due, to 
some extent, to the consequences of weak public institutions and the lack 
of democratic governance in addition to, and with special reference to, the 
strong national and international private power with direct interest in ter-
ritories of indigenous peoples and afro-descendants. Regardless of that fact, 
it is possible to conclude that at least some Courts have fulfilled their role. 
However, the main part of the solution is in the hands of the executive 
branch. Unfortunately, in a hyperpresidentialist system, which controls almost 
everything, several developments or emblematic examples of transforma-
tive constitutionalism are confined to academic publications and forums. 
The specialized doctrine has pointed out the relevance of a deliberative and 
collective process far from a “monologue” or “soliloquy” to find a shared 
solution to be mutually acceptable.92
Together with other scholars in the region, I also understand judicial dia-
logue as an exchange that allows both domestic courts in distinct levels and 
the ACtHR “to be active participants with a mutual give-and-take in defining 
the content of fundamental rights in the region”.93 This understanding of dia-
90  With regard to supranational integration in the region see e.g. herrera, J. C. Integration 
Clauses in the Constitutions of South American Countries. In Colombia Internacional. No. 86, 
2016, 165; herrera, J. C. Latin American Integration Clause in Colombia: Between the “Bond 
of Union” and the Tautology of “Straitjacket”. In Revista Derecho del Estado. No. 37, 2016, 
127-163, 127.
91  The developments explained attempt to complement the critics and annotations raised 
by sChettini, A. Toward a New Paradigm of Human Rights Protection for Indigenous Peoples: 
A Critical Analysis of the Parameters Established by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
In sur-International Journal on Human Rights. Vol. 9, No. 17, 59-86; and aguilar Cavallo, G. 
Emergence of a Common Constitutional Law? Indigenous Peoples’ Case, Part i and Part ii. In 
Revista Derecho del Estado. No. 25-26, 41 and 51, respectively. 
92  “The objective pursued is not the identity, it is compatibility; not uniformity in other 
words to harmonize.” saiz, A. La interacción entre los tribunales que garantizan derechos 
humanos: razones para el diálogo [Interaction between Courts that guarantee human rights: 
Reasons for the dialogue]. In saiz, A.; solanes, J. and roa, J. E. (Eds.), Diálogos judiciales en 
el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2017, 31. (Own 
translation).
93  Carozza, P. G. and gonzález, P. The Final Word? Constitutional Dialogue and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Reply to Jorge Contesse. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law. Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017, 436-442, 440. 
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logue is constructed without having in mind bottom-up/top-down approaches 
or hierarchical traditional approaches proper of the nation-state stage. In the 
construction of a supranational structure, we cannot expect a perfect paradise 
without conflicts and tensions in the understanding of the law. 
There are conflicts and problems in the national sphere between supreme/
constitutional courts and federal or regional tribunals and in the supranational 
space. Uniformity and diversity are a “pervasive and probably everlasting” 
issue in which a “model of dialogue does not determine a particular outcome 
in advance”.94 However, something is clear in the Latin American case, if 
today we have seen further and reached a balanced standard of protection in 
several constitutional matters it is by standing on the shoulders of the Inter-
American Court.95 
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS INFORMED CONSENT?
The past decades have seen the rapid development of prior and informed 
consultation in the case law of the CCC and the iaCtHR. Both tribunals have 
echoed a creative judicial dialogue. Especially, the national court has brought 
the protection further to empower the voice and self-government of indigenous 
peoples and afro-descendants. Courts and scholars should consider these 
constitutional precedents and archetypical examples of transformative ius 
commune in Latin America. Alternatively, the so-called global north should 
heed these advances. Especially, the self-proclaimed “developed world’ (for 
instance, Canada, usa or Australia), which under basic principles and values 
have a duty to protect their indigenous and afro-descendants peoples at home 
and the responsibility in their investments and actions worldwide.96 
This begets to answer the question: should the international community 
or single states require the ratification of ilo 169/89 or environmental in-
struments to allow investments that literally imply exploitation of natural 
resources and peoples in protected areas? Yes. An era of global investments 
demands global commitments. 
To materialize fPiC in the cases studied, the CCC proposes applying the 
pro homine principle in particular cases and re-conceptualizing the notion 
94  See torres. Conflicts of Rights in the European Union, cit., 183.
95  See sChönsteiner, Beltrán y Puga and lovera. Reflections on the Human Rights 
Challenges of Consolidating Democracies, cit.
96  For instance, see the careless footnotes one and two of the American Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2016) that shows the level of commitment that “developed” 
countries in the north of America have with the indigenous peoples and afro-descendants of the 
hemisphere: “the United States has, however, persistently objected to the text of this American 
Declaration, which is not itself legally binding and therefore does not create new law”. “Canada 
has not participated substantively in recent years in negotiations on the American Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it is not able at this time to take a position on the proposed 
text of this Declaration.”
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of prior for the before, during and after principle. In addition, the case law 
of the Colombian court points out the reasons why it is unbearable to set a 
specific term in advance for the consultation process and why consultation 
should be applied in all kind of micro or macro intervention (see Graphs 
4 and 5). Nowadays, the opportunity is in the hands of the Inter-American 
Court and the rest of the national and regional judges, governments, parlia-
ments, scholars, and other parties to take part in this supranational dialogue. 
Questions have been raised about the relevance of binding consent instead 
of veto in the exclusive hands of no party. Consequently, national parliaments 
and courts should consider the observations which have been explained and 
carefully constructed over a period of 25 years. A contribution to the ius 
commune in the region or to the idea of a whole than is more than the sum 
of its parts. 
In moving forward, it is important to note, there is a need to reformulate 
the boundaries between legislation and case law in Latin America. Although 
this issue includes the arena of supranational integration and the framework 
of a broader ius constitutionale commune, the execution of such a constitu-
tional challenge does not only imply the protection of fundamental rights. 
Therefore, a reformulation towards the engine room of the constitution is 
mandatory and fPiC consultation has become a potential example of it. 
This study shows the construction of the most balanced level of protec-
tion in the case law of the Inter-American Court and the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia. Different countries shall be prevented from shaping different 
standards of protection for communities that historically have faced com-
mon discrimination. Take, for instance, the case of indigenous peoples in the 
Amazon basin. One standard for Brazil, Venezuela or Peru and another in 
Ecuador or Colombia is unfair. This atomization is itself a cause of inequality 
and inefficiency. Especially for ancestral groups, concepts such as border or 
property in western terms are very cumbersome. 
Dialogic constitutionalism is an important method but not a goal in and of 
itself. Therefore, the solution ought to come from the sum of national interests 
in a systemic and functional approach. Why not in the sphere of economic, 
political, and social supranational integration? Why not be inspired by the 
idea of an ever closer union? Why not be encouraged by a clever closer union 
among the peoples of Latin America? 
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APPENDIX
TABLE 3
CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF COLOMBIA RELATED  
TO REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND PRIOR CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS. 
ABSTRACT CONTROL
Case regulation deCision
1 C-169/01 Electoral constituency for black communities. Bill 028/99 
Senate and 217/99 House of representatives
Partially
Unconstitutional
2 C-418/02 Mining Code. Article 122, Law 685/01 Constitutional*
3 C-891/02 Mining Code. Articles 2, 3 and others, Law 685/01 Constitutional*
4 C-620/03 Manaure Saltworks law. Article 1, Law 773/02 Constitutional*
5 C-245/04 Administration of expropriated assets. Law 785/02 Constitutional*
6 C-208/07 Professionalization of Teaching Act. Law-Decree 1278/02 Constitutional*
7 C-921/07 Educational services of education and health. Constitutional*
8 C-030/08 General Forestry Law. Law 1021/06 Unconstitutional
Leading case
9 C-461/08 National Plan of Development (2006-2010). Law 1151/07 Constitutional*
10 C-750/08 Free Trade Agreement, Colombia and USA. Law 1143/07 Constitutional*
11 C-175/09 Development in Rural Areas Act. Law 1152/07 Unconstitutional
12 C-615/09 Integral development and basic assistance for the Wayúu 
community. Law 1214/08
Unconstitutional
13 C-063/10  Modification in the National Health System. Article 14, 
Law 1122/07
Constitutional*
14 C-608/10 Free Trade Agreement, Colombia and Canada Constitutional*
15 C-702/10 Endorsement of indigenous candidates. Section 8 
of Article, Legislative Act 01/09, reforming Article 108 
of the Constitution. Electoral issues 
Unconstitutional
16 C-915/10 Environmental Agreement between Colombia and Canada. Constitutional* 
17 C-941/10 Free Trade Agreement Colombia and some EU Countries. Constitutional*
18 C-027/11 Technical and Scientific Cooperation between Colombia 
and Guatemala. 
Constitutional 
19 C-187/11 Fundamental Rights Agreement between Colombia and 
Canada regarding fta. Law 1411/10 
Constitutional
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Case regulation deCision
20 C-490-11 Statutory Act 190/10. Organization and functioning of 
political parties. Several articles. 
Partially
Unconstitutional
21 C-196/12 International Tropical Timber Agreement. Law 1458/11 Constitutional*
22 C-317/12
C-318/12
General “Royalty” System and Compensation. Legislative 
Act 05/11, Arts. 360 and 361 of the Constitution.
Constitutional*
23 C-366/11 Mining Code. Law 1382/10 and Law 685/01 
Ratified I decisions C-367/11 and C-027/12
Unconstitutional
24 C-882/11 Legislative Act 02/09, reforming Article 49 
of the Constitution. Coca lead.
Constitutional*
25 C-937/11 General Law of Education. Law 115/94 Inhibition 
26 C-051/12 Free Trade Agreement, Modification Protocol (Mexico, 
Colombia, and Venezuela). Law 1457/11
Constitutional*
27 C-293/12 International Network of Bamboo and Rattan. Law 1461/11 Constitutional*
28 C-331/12
C-398/12
National Plan of Development (2010-2014). Arts. 106 and 
276, Law 1450/11
Constitutional*
29 C-395/12 Mining Code. Articles 11, 35 and others, Law 685/01, and 
Article 76, Law 99/93. Environmental issues. 
Constitutional*
30 C-540/12 Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities. Constitutional
31 C-641/12 National Healthcare System. Law 1438/11 Constitutional*
32 C-765/12 Healthcare System Reform. Law 1438/11 Constitutional
33 C-767/12 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions. Law 1516/12
Constitutional*
34 C-822/12 “Metre” Convention. Law 1512/12 Constitutional 
35 C-943/12 National Authority of Environmental Licenses. 
Law 3573/11
Constitutional
36 C-068/13 General Royalty System and Compensations. 
Article 156, Law 1530/12
Constitutional
37 C-194/13 Criminal Code. Law 1482/11 Constitutional
38 C-253/13 “Negro” expression in the Law 70/93 Constitutional
39 C-371/14 “Peasant farmer reserve zones”. Law 160/94 Constitutional*
40 C-501/14 Vegetables varieties. Article 306, Law 599/00 Constitutional
41 C-389/16 Mining Code. Several articles Constitutional* 
* With specifications regarding the implementation in concrete situations. Decisions are hyperlinked for 
the digital version. 
Source: Author’s compilation from the database available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/
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TABLE 4
CASE LAW OF THE CCC TUTELAS REGARDING DIRECT INTERVENTIONS 
IN TERRITORIES PROTECTED BY PRIOR CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS.
CONCRETE CONTROL
Case Core issue deCision
1 T-428/92 Construction of Andes-Jardín road Granted 
2 T-405/93 Radar and air base in indigenous communities of the Middle 
Amazon
Granted
3 SU-039/97 Oil exploitation in U’wa territories Granted 
4 T-652/98 Urrá dam Granted 
5 T-634/99 Expansion of a municipality and other mechanism of protection Denied
6 SU-383/03 Fumigation of illegal plantations in the Amazon region Granted 
7 T-955/03 Forest exploitation in Cacarica basin territories of Afro-
communities 
Granted 
8 T-737/05 Legal recognition of a Yanacona community Granted 
9 T-382/06 Tutela against General Law Forestry Bill 25/04 Rejected
10 T-880/06 Oil exploitation in Motilón Barí territories El Progreso Granted 
11 T-154/09 Construction of an irrigation district and temporality of tutela Denied
12 T-769/09 Mining project Mandé Norte of Muriel Mining Corporation Granted
13 T-547/10 Multipurpose port Brisa in Sierra Nevada Granted
14 T-745/10 Improvement of a road in Barú Afro territories Granted 
15 T-1045A/10 Gold-mining in Cauca, La Toma de Suárez Granted 
16 T-116/11 Ethno-educators for the Gaitana community Granted 
17 T-129/11
Leading case
Interamerican road construction, gold mining, electricity towers, 
and illegal occupation in Emberá Katío territories
Granted 
18 T-235/11 Disaster prevention and assistance, the case of Pepitas river Granted 
19 T-379/11 Ethno-educators for Quillasinga community Granted 
20 T-474/11 Mining corporation against tutela orders Rejected 
21 T-601/11 Illegal renovation of authorities in San Lorenzo community Granted 
22 T-693/11 Environmental permit for the construction of a pipeline in Campo 
Rubiales without consultation of Turpial community
Granted 
23 T-698/11 License to build a telecommunication base station in 
Cañamomo-Lomaprieta territories 
Granted 
24 T-376/12 “Private beach” v. Afro-Colombian informal worker from La 
Boquilla afro community 
Granted
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Case Core issue deCision
25 T-477/12 Government authorization that allowed a private company to 
commercialize the brand “Indigenous coca” 
Granted 
26 T-513/12 Government authorization which recognizes the existence of a 
new communal organization due to religious separation 
Granted 
27 T-514/12 Ethno-educator in the Kwe’sx nasa Ksxa Wnxi institution Granted
28 T-680/12 Collective title of lands for Afro-Colombians on El Rosario island Granted 
29 T-693/12 Construction of a road Loboguerrero-Mediacanoa Granted 
30 T-823/12 Elections of representatives to national and local authorities (afro 
communities of La Plata Bahía Malaga)
Granted 
31 T-993/12 Construction of the variante El Guamo road Granted 
32 T-1080/12 Regulation of streams that cross Dujos Tamás-Páez territories Granted 
33 T-049/13 Ethno-educators for several Yanacona groups Granted 
34 T-245/13 Municipal Development Plan that was consulted Denied 
35 T-172/13 Multipurpose port in the island of Barú and participation of Afro-
Colombians of the area 
Granted 
36 T-300/13 Eradication of African palm without specific harm Denied 
37 T-390/13 Ethno-educators for the Yascual community Granted 
38 T-657/13 Planning of the Mulaló-Loboguerrero road Granted 
39 T-795/13 Mobile army radio station which broadcast music and promotes 
recruitment of indigenous to participate in the internal conflict 
Granted 
40 T-858/13 Building materials quarry and inappropriate use of tutela Rejected 
41 T-871/13 Ethno-educators of Pijao community in the Tolima region Granted 
42 T-117/14 Political rights of candidates to Congress of the Republic Granted 
43 T-204/14 Artisanal mining without authorization Denied 
44 T-294/14 Landfill Cantagallo in Venado community territories Granted 
45 T-353/14 Municipal Development Plan of Palermo, Huila Granted 
46 T-355/14 Ethno-educators for the Candelaria community Granted
47 T-384A/14 Resolution declaring nature reserve and limits in the Natural Park 
Yaigojé-Apaporis
Denied 
48 T-396/14 Road in San Agustin archaeological park Rejected 
49 T-461/14 Problem of boundaries between the territories of an Indigenous 
community and peoples of African descent
Granted 
50 T-462A/14 Salvajina dam in the Cauca region Granted 
51 T-576/14 Recognition and adjudication of territories for Afro-Colombian 
communities, raizales and palenqueras
Granted 
52 T-646/14 Tutela against bill of Customs Act Denied 
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Case Core issue deCision
53 T-800/14 Spa on Providencia island affecting the raizal community Granted 
54 T-849/14 Mining concession in Sierra Nevada territories of Arhuacos, 
within the so-called black line
Granted 
55 T-857/14 Small dam project in Embera jurisdiction Denied 
56 T-969/14 Wastewater disposal Emisario Submarino in community of 
African descendants near Cartagena 
Granted 
57 T-247/15 Mapayerri peoples and reformation of cadaster record without 
consultation 
Granted 
58 T-256/15 Pollution by the emission of carbon particles in territories of Afro-
Colombians from Barrancas in La Guajira
Granted 
59 T-359/15 Oil exploitation in territories of Awa indigenous peoples located in 
Putumayo region 
Granted 
60 T-438/15 Artisanal and informal gold mining in the historic and emblematic 
town of Marmato, Caldas
Annulled 
61 T-485/15 Community of African descent on the Barú island near Cartagena. 
Planning and execution of a hotel project
Granted 
62 T-550/15 Tourist boardwalk in Buenaventura on the Pacific coast Rejected 
63 T-597/15 Temporal restriction to work on a beach Denied 
64 T-660/15 Railway line transporting carbon in territories of Afro community 
Suto Gende Ase Ngande
Granted 
65 T-661/15 Wayúu clans in conflict by administrative decision that 
adjudicated territories under dispute and infrastructure projects 
Granted 
66 T-764/15 Oil exploitation in territories of Pirirí community (Puerto Gaitán) Granted 
67 T-766/15 The high impact case of mining strategic areas across the country Granted 
68 T-005/16 Military base and telecommunications towers in Arhuacos 
territories
Granted 
69 T-041/16 Environmental license for oil extraction in territories  
of indigenous Corozal Tapaojo
Denied 
70 T-110/16 Tutela against bill for special territorial organization zidres Denied 
71 T-197/16 Pipeline construction and operation Loop San Mateo - Mamonal 
in territories of indigenous Pasacaballo
Granted 
72 T-213/16 Tutela against Law 223/2015 for special territorial organization 
Zidres 
Denied 
73 T-226/16 Afro community La Boquilla and fulfilment of Decision T-376/12 Denied
74 T-288A/16 Guatavita Tua indigenous community and the construction of a 
pipeline towards the Pacific Ocean 
Granted 
75 T-313/16 Pijao community and a problem of overlapping territories Denied
76 T-436/16 Zenú people against the construction of a road Granted
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Case Core issue deCision
77 T-475/16 Early childhood plan that was not consulted with an afro community Granted
78 T-530/16 Delimitation of territories of Emberas chamí and afro community 
in Caldas region 
Granted
79 T-605/16 Loop pipeline San Mateo-Mamonal in territories of indigenous 
Maisheshe La Chivera
Granted
80 T-704/16 Enlargement of a port and the rights of Media Luna Dos peoples Granted
81 T-730/16 Oil exploitation in Putumayo territories of Naza peoples Granted
82 SU-133/17 Artisanal and informal gold mining in the historical and 
emblematic town of Marmato, Caldas
Granted 
Note: Decisions are hyperlinked for the digital version.
Source: Author’s compilation from the database available at: www.corteconstitucional.gov.co 
 
TABLE 5
STANDARDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF COLOMBIA REGARDING 
DIRECT INTERVENTIONS IN TERRITORIES PROTECTED BY PRIOR 
CONSULTATION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND AFRO-DESCENDANTS. 
CONCRETE CONTROL. (DECISION T-129/11)
(i) Prior consultation is a right of a fundamental nature and the processes of consultation of 
indigenous peoples and afro-descendants will be developed according to this guiding criterion 
both in its projection and implementation.
(ii) Adverse or confrontational postures are not allowed during the prior consultation process. 
It is a dialogue between equals with differences.
(iii) Procedures that do not comply with the essential requirements of the prior consultation 
processes, i.e. associated consultation to mere administrative procedures, briefings or 
related actions are not allowed.
(iv) It is necessary to establish effective communication relationships based on the principle of 
good faith, which contemplates the specific circumstances of each group and the relevance 
for the territory and its resources.
(v) It is mandatory that the process of consultation and the search for consent are not set in 
advance with a fixed term. Each term should be considered under a strategy of differential 
approach or according to the particularities of the ethnic group and their traditions. Especially 
in the stage of planning and not just before the execution of the project. 
(vi) It is mandatory to define the procedure to be followed in each consultation process, through 
a pre-consultative and/or post-consultative process to be carried out between the parties. 
Participation must be understood not only to the previous stage of the process but also to 
subsequent stages on the intervention. (Ex-ante, during, and ex-post principle). 
(vii) It is mandatory to carry out an exercise that balances the interests at stake and the rights, 
alternatives, and perspectives of the indigenous peoples and afro-descendants affected only 
by those constitutionally imperative limitations. (Principle of proportionality complemented 
in Decision T-376/12).
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(viii) The search for free, prior, and informed consent is mandatory. Communities may determine the 
least harmful alternative in those cases when the intervention: (a) involves the displacement; 
(b) carries out storage or dumping of toxic waste; and/or (c) represents a high social, cultural, 
and environmental impact on an ethnic community, leading to the risk of its existence.
After exploring the less harmful alternatives for ethnic communities and with the demonstration 
that all are detrimental, and that intervention would lead to the disappearance of indigenous 
peoples and afro-descendants, the protection of their right prevails under the pro homine 
principle. (Binding consent). 
(ix) It is mandatory that environmental and archaeological authorities check that the authorizations 
have not been issued without verification of the prior consultation and approval of an 
environmental and archaeological management plan. Without this requirement, the interventions 
in protected territories should stop.
(x) It is mandatory to ensure that the benefits of the intervention or the exploitation of resources 
are equitably shared as well with the compliance and mitigation measures or compensation 
for damages.
(xi) It is imperative that indigenous peoples and afro-descendants count with the support of the 
Ombudsman and the General Inspector of the Nation (Procuraduría General de la Nación) 
in the consultation process. Even with the possibility of having the support of international 
organizations or ngo’s with mandates oriented at preventing and protecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples and afro-descendants.
Source: Author’s translation from the leading case T-129/11. 
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